Maurice Bloch (2008) in his article Why Religion is Nothing Special but is Central argues that religious thought is a part of a key neurological adaptation evolved around the time of the Upper Paleolithic. This is the capacity to live largely in imagination which distinguishes humans from other species. Thus “religion” itself appears as a modern invention and a misleading analytical category for social scientists. Bloch also opposes cognitive anthropologists, Dan Sperber and Pascal Boyer who explain religious thought as phenomenon mainly constituted of counter-intuitive beliefs.
To build his alternative theory about imagination, Bloch suggests three counter arguments: First he argues that religion can not be explained by “cognitive malfunctions.” Secondly, he opposes cognitive anthropologists who try to find out why people believe specifically in God or other religious agents, and hence, reify “religion” as a separate concept. Third, he argues that “religion” can not be explained as a product of core knowledge or modular capacities, since this scientific approach does not differentiate human beings from other species (2008:2055).
In order to explain what “religion” counts for, Bloch distinguishes two concepts: transactional and transcendental social (2008:2055-60). The former is equally characteristic for chimpanzees and for humans. It is a set of roles and social positions which are constantly changing. For instance, chimpanzees might have long-lasting coalitions but if a dominant animal loses its physical power, it loses its position too. The second category transcends individual cases and consists of essentialized social roles and groups. Bloch gives an example of the Malagasy elder, who may grow old and become physically weak but his position in the village as a respectable man does not change. Humans may hold both roles, transactional and transcendental simultaneously. The social institution of an elder makes a certain individual influential even after he loses his transactional power. By ascribing oneself to a certain transcendental category, one becomes the member of a group even though he or she has never been in touch with other members. The nation is an example of such imagined community (Anderson 1983). Transcendental network also involves gender roles, creating types of a man and a woman. According to Bloch, it may also include ancestors and Gods along with the living people.
After defining two key concepts Bloch explains the relation between transcendental social and “religion”. He proposes that dead ancestors have the same ontological status as elders, both transcend the category of the transactional social and are imbued with special mysterious attitude. Also, ancestor worship can be considered the same religious act as worshiping God, both belong to the transcendental social. Thus why we do not have separate religions of elders or ancestors? All these roles belong to the realm of transcendental which involves Gods and ordinary people.
Block gives a historical account to illustrate how the concept of religion was developed. He argues that initially the political and the religious were inseparable, and both belonged to transcendental social. At the example of Merina state in Madagascar in 18th and 19th century he shows that states represented incomplete transcendental social, they used to rise and collapse, and the residue which remained after the destruction of a “pseudo cosmic order” later became called “religion”. It became appropriated by religious organizations. This might also explain modern phenomenon what he calls “flirting relationships” between the state and religions entities.
If the “religion” is a misleading category, thus what should social scientists study? Here Bloch argues that social scientists have to explain not religion as sui generis, but the capacity of imagination since it differentiates humans from other anthropoids. Scientists have to search for the neurological evidence which would explain how it is possible that humans establish relationships with imaginary agents and live with them in the same social system.
Religion as a Category
The term imaginary is not new and it is widely used by social scientists (see Anderson 1991; Taylor 2004). Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor’s (2004) concept of social imaginary refers to the possibilities of people to construct images of the social environment they live in. According to Taylor, we imagine our social surroundings and express them through images and narratives which are shared by the large group of people. If we consider Weber’s (1963) “disenchantment of the world”, religion also can be one of the realms of social imaginary. However, Bloch in his article suggests that social scientists should study imagination as a neurological process and link to social implications. Below I will address Bloch’s arguments each by one and compare to Boyer’s explanation based on his several articles.
I agree with Bloch that religion is a recent invention and pseudo-scientific category monopolized mostly by Christianity. Religious organizations used to define what could belong to the religious domain and what could not. It resulted into the persecution of so called “pagan cultures.” As elsewhere in the world it took place in Georgia. Svaneti is a mountainous region in Georgia, where Afterlife is perceived as real as the world of the living people. Highlanders in this place believe that in other world the dead lead the same lifestyle as here; they need food, horses, and weapons. These items are usually buried with the dead body. During this time they avoid speaking loudly at home not to disturb their ancestors; also they go to the mountain pick and raise glasses for them. It is believed that spirits from all families gather in some secluded place to decide the fate of each villager for the next year. Svans generally declare themselves Orthodox Christians, but they integrate ancestor worship in the same religious system, where such practices and rituals are called “paganism.” Official Church in Georgia was always trying to eliminate this tradition. To employ Maurice Bloch’s concept, it seems ancestors and Gods in Svaneti belong to the same transcendental social. Thus the question, why social scientists continue reifying the same misleading category is absolutely central.
In the article Bloch cites the Boyer’s books The naturalness of Religious Ideas and Cognitive theory of Religion (1994) and Religion explained (2002). He notes that despite the fact Boyer asserts that he is not talking about “religion” per se, he still names books under the same label “religion”. However, it seems that in the last period, their approaches towards religion do not diverge. Boyer shares the same attitude in his blog, published in 2011. He writes:
“There really is no such thing as “religion”…”Religion” is the recent invention of special organizations that flourished in early states, typically in literate societies. These institutions grouped ritual specialists who collectively tried to set up a corporate monopoly on the provision of particular services – and gradually associated stable doctrine, ritual standardization, exclusivity of services and other aspects of corporate branding.”
Boyer does not say that there is “religion” per se in his earlier articles either. Sperber and Boyer both argue that what we call “religion” mainly consists of counter-intuitive beliefs which are catchy and hence, easily transmitted. In the article Evolutionary Perspectives on Religion published in Annual Review of Anthropology Boyer and Bergstrom clarify that what explains religious thought or behavior may also explain other domains of cultural thought and behavior (2008:112). Authors argue that there is no specific quality of religious phenomena that requires explanation (2008:112).
“Religion is not a natural kind, integrated package”, instead, Boyer and Bergstrom (2008) talk about mental representations of supernatural agents, spirits, ghosts, ancestors etc. They argue that religious-like beliefs are found in fantasy, dreams and superstitions. Such kind of beliefs are attention-grabbing and easily transmitted because they violate standard intuitive expectations (2008:119). For instance, the God can move and see. At the same time, these representations activate standard expectations of intuitive psychology (God perceives what happens).
However, Bloch (2005) does not agree with this explanation. For him stories about “dragons” (Sperber[1982] 1991) belong to this domain but counter-intuitiveness is not an explanation for Malagasy people who usually communicate with dead ancestors (2002:114). It is an interesting point: connection with ancestors is so natural for Malagasy that it was never questioned, marked as peculiar, in other words, something which looks weird for us, might be ordinary for other people. It raises the question: Can something which is not considered as counter-intuitive by certain people be regarded a priori counter-intuitive or should we base our conclusions in the context of the specific cultures?
Bloch (2005) argues that the representation which is understood as a counter-intuitive when a person comes across it for the first time, does not have the same cognitive significance where everybody takes this representation already for granted. I can not approve or disapprove any of these arguments, simply because I lack an academic competence in this specific field, but it raises a question whether it is necessary to consciously analyze that a particular idea or representation is counter-intuitive? Or is it an implicit process? I still think that the relation between intuitive and counter-intuitive may be culturally specific and thus some supernatural agents are not necessarily counter-intuitive in a given context.
Should Religious Thought Be Singled Out From Transcendental Social?
As I have already mentioned, Bloch argues that “religion” can not be explained as a product of core knowledge or modular capacities, since this scientific approach does not differentiate human beings from other species.
In fact, can religious-like representations be distinguished from other kinds of imaginary representations which Bloch (2008) lumps under the same overarching category of transcendental social? Boyer (2000) singles out Gods, ancestors and such kind of strategic supernatural agents as holders of information which is important for humans in social interaction. By means of using complicated system of collecting strategic information (which involves supernatural agents too) humans are distinguished from other species.
Boyer (2000) argues that what we call religion “is not just any cultural institution where supernatural imagination is active”. He says religion differs from fiction, dreams or fairy tales because people are strongly committed to religious ideas. Religion is associated with group identity, creates social ties and requires different kind of emotional involvement. It also creates the whole set of moral prescriptions. From evolutionary perspective, during the natural selection these representations undergo through different stages: As I already discussed socially significant supernatural agents have perception, belief, intention, and thus they agree with our intuitive psychology. This is the common feature for all powerful imaginative representations. Boyer (2000) suggests that what distinguishes humans from other species is the way we sort out so called strategic information, important for cooperation.
“Strategic information is that subset of all the information currently available (about a particular situation) that happens to activate intuitive mental processes that regulate cooperation.”
Boyer (2000) points out that if chimpanzees use specific signals to show willingness for grooming, humans use much more complicated system to engage in cooperation: they turn to imagined supernatural agents since they are implicitly considered to “have good access to information”, important for the social interaction. They are omnipresent and at the same time invisible. They know about people’s intentions, motivations, and actions. Ancestors see how their disciples behave. It explains connection between religious affiliation and group identity. Boyer (2000) notes:
“If concepts of strategic agents are (in part) signals of reliability, we should predict, not necessarily that people will trust potential partners who share their religious commitments, but that they should distrust people who do not.”
I think this is not only implicit consideration but also an explicit inference. While conducting a research in Budapest mosque about Muslim women, leaders of the mosque would tell me that the idea of gathering Muslim community together is to ensure that people are surrounded by those who share the same values.
To sum up, I agree with Bloch that religion should not be reified by social scientists as a separate analytical category. On the other hand, it requires an explanation why are certain categories (religious in this case) more successful than others, why do they have moral prescriptions and are tied to group identity. However, answering this question only by means of cognitive processes in individuals is not enough. Social institutions, such as Church, Muslim organizations etc. play an essential role to maintain religious ideas in society. Let us imagine, that such organizations are eliminated: would we talk about the same processes developing in the human brain? I do not believe that the human brain operates the same way in different cultural contexts; however, there must be some universal cognitive mechanisms which determine maintenance and transmission of particular ideas, as it is discussed by Sperber and Boyer.
References:
Bloch, Maurice. 2008. Why religion is nothing special but is central. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. 363:2055-2061.
Bloch, Maurice. 2005. “Are Religious Beliefs Counter-Intuitive?” in Essays on Cultural
Transmission, vol. 75, LSE Monographs on Social Anthropology. Edited by M.
Bloch. Oxford, New York: Berg.Boyer, Pascal. 2011. “Why Would (otherwise intelligent) Scholars Believe in “Religion”?
(International Cognition and Culture Institute, February 21, 2011. Retrieved April 5,
2013, http://www.cognitionandculture.net/home/blog/35-pascals-blog/764-why-would-otherwise-intelligent-scholars-believe-in-qreligionq
Boyer, Pascal. 2000. Functional Origins of Religious Concepts: Ontological and Strategic
Selection in Evolved Minds [Malinowski Lecture 1999] Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute 6 :195 -214.
Taylor, Charles. 2004. “On Social Imaginary”, at archive.org”. Archived from the original on 2004-10-19. Retrieved 2013.
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